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Fire and EMS responders have had little involvement with fusion center operations, and 
this directly impacts the country’s safety. Only a handful of fusion centers have 
integrated the fire and emergency medical services (EMS) responders into the collection, 
analysis, and sharing of information on homeland security activities. This thesis analyzes 
the predominant practices of five fusion centers that have integrated fire and EMS 
responders into their reporting process. The highlighted practices from the study of these 
fusion centers can be utilized to expand the integration at fusion centers across the 
country and to further expand the role of the fire and EMS responder in homeland 
security. Implementing these practices involves the fusion centers commitment to 
integration, to cooperation, and to preparedness. 
Having basic terrorism behavior training, along with suspicious-activity indicator 
awareness, sets the baseline for fire and EMS agencies to select key decision makers who 
become the liaison with the fusion center. Sufficient quantities of fusion center liaisons 
are needed to support the size and number of agencies in the fusion centers’ area of 
responsibility. Having uniformed senior fire and EMS line officers staffing the liaison 
positions will expand the trust of the fusion centers’ processes while providing more 
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Across the United States nearly two million fire and EMS personnel provide emergency 
services to the just over 322 million residents.1 Their role in our communities has 
expanded to include response to chemical, biological, and radiological attacks/threats, as 
well as attacks inspired by radical Islamic jihadism. This expansion of duties is in 
reaction to life-changing events, such as the 9/11 attacks in New York, the Pentagon, and 
the crash of flight 93 in the Stone Creek Township corn field, the mass transit attacks in 
London and Madrid, as well as the hybrid targeted violence2 similar to the 2008 Mumbai 
attacks. Fire and emergency management service (EMS) personnel are now trained and 
prepared for an ever-increasing range of threats, emergencies, and incidents.  
In spite of their expanded role, fire and EMS personnel across the country have 
yet to consistently incorporate intelligence activities. Although most fire and EMS 
personnel have a basic level of awareness, and in some cases, specific intelligence 
training, the focus from the fusion centers is primarily information dissemination. 
Alarmingly, what is missing is a consistent processes and training to ensure that fire and 
EMS personnel are actively involved in the collection and reporting of suspicious activity 
to state/local/tribal/territorial (SLTT) fusion centers so that the information they receive 
is more coordinated and relevant to fire and EMS. 
Since 9/11, the distillation and dissemination of intelligence and information   has 
become the trademark responsibility of the fusion centers. A fusion center has many 
configurations, but in general it is an administrative workspace, sponsored by a state or 
local government, that supports the intelligence needs of multiple agencies including: law 
enforcement (state/local/federal/tribal), fire and EMS, public health, private sector, and 
emergency planners during steady state and emerging situations. No one center is alike; 
                                                 
1 “U.S and World Population Clock,” U.S. Census Bureau, accessed November 1, 2015, 
http://www.census.gov/popclock/. 
2 Tracy L. Frazzano, and Snyder, G. Matthew, “Hybrid Targeted Violence: Challenging Conventional 
“Active Shooter” Response Strategies,” Homeland Security Affairs 10 (February 2014), article 3, 
https://www.hsaj.org/articles/253.   
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each fusion center has diverse missions, different intelligence capabilities, and varying 
staffing requirements.  
Fusion centers frequently include a: watch section, intelligence and analysis staff, 
and liaison and training personnel that interact with public and private sector stakeholders 
in their area of responsibility. As of August 2015, there were 78 fusion centers 
throughout the country and U.S. territories, with one center per state while some states 
support additional fusion centers in their major urban areas. 
Fire and EMS providers are critical components in homeland security. 
Unfortunately, the vast majority of these providers are untapped or underutilized as 
submitters of suspicious activity reports. The approaches for outreach, interaction, and 
education that have been effective with law enforcement since 9/11 do not cross over to 
the fire and EMS community. 
This thesis examines the current outreach systems to fire and EMS agencies in 
place at selected fusion centers. The centers where identified through in-person 
conversations with senior fire and EMS agency subject matter experts. These fusion 
centers are known as centers having effective outreach, interaction, and education 
programs involving fire and EMS agencies. The five centers studied are the Arizona 
Counter Terrorism Information Center, the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence 
Center, the Southern Nevada Counter Terrorism Center, the Southwest Texas Fusion 
Center, and the Northern Virginia Regional Intelligence Center. 
The primary research questions are: What has occurred since 2001 to integrate 
fire and EMS agencies in the information sharing and collaboration process performed by 
fusion centers? What forms of outreach, interaction, and education programs are used by 
specified fusion centers to interact with fire and EMS agencies?  
This thesis utilizes a qualitative comparative analysis that focuses on the core 
components of outreach, interaction, and education using the appreciative inquiry 4-D 
cycle analytical method. In addition, a data capture form for historical and factual 
information was developed and sent to each fusion center. The data capture form 
collected geographic data for each center’s area of responsibility, structure and staffing 
 xvii 
style, operation and outreach programs, and a description of the center’s suspicious 
activity reporting procedures. 
This thesis focuses on four key functions that are present in the studied centers 
and can be used to improve the operations at other fusion centers:  
1. Provide basic terrorism outreach and education training to all public safety 
personnel via the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative 
platform.  
2. Transition to an intelligence liaison officer liaison model, from the more 
common terrorism liaison officer model, with all willing fire and EMS 
agencies to have key decision makers selected to receive the fusion center 
products.  
3. Utilize uniformed senior fire and EMS line officers as subject matter 
experts to the fusion center analysis staff. These officers would provide 
support to the fusion center staff and analysts and provide a bridge from 
the field personnel.  
4. Provide sufficient liaisons to support broad geographical areas to address 
span of control and to improve the ability for the liaison to interact with 
field personnel. 
These practices have resulted in effective interaction, outreach, and education 
programs to the fire and EMS agencies and should be considered for adoption in other 
fusion centers. The ability for the fire or EMS personnel to identify and appropriately 
report suspicious behaviors and indicators of potential terrorist activities would result in 
more actionable intelligence that could prevent future tragedies. The two million fire and 
EMS responders answer thousands of calls a day and have unparalleled access to private 
places, and their expanded ability to submit suspicious activity reports  will better enable 
law enforcement to interrupt the planning of a terror plot. 
The fusion centers have developed into a strong network of analysis and sharing 
centers of terrorism data. The effectiveness of the fusion centers can be improved with 
the broader integration of fire and EMS agencies and personnel. This expansion requires 
intergroup communication and sharing as well as funding to place the proper personnel in 
the fusion centers. 
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Since the fire service began in 1735 with Ben Franklin’s Union Fire Company,1 
the career and volunteer members of the local fire and emergency medical services 
(EMS) departments are every community’s first responders. They respond to a wide 
range of events from simple emergencies to complex disasters. 
Spread out throughout the 3.8 million square miles, the United States today is 
protected by over one million fire fighters2 and just over 900,000 EMS personnel.3 These 
two million personnel are spread among nearly 50,000 departments covering macro 
metropolitan urban areas to those in the barren mid-west deserts and mountains, 
providing service to just over 322 million residents.4  
Their role in our communities has expanded to include response to chemical, 
biological, and radiological attacks and threats, as well as attacks inspired by radical 
violent extremists. The expanded, all-hazards response capability stems from the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001 against New York, the Pentagon, the crash of flight 93 in 
the Stone Creek Township corn field, the mass transit attacks in London and Madrid, as 
well as the hybrid targeted violence5 similar to the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Fire and EMS 
personnel are now preparing for an ever-increasing range of threats, emergencies, and 
incidents that would cause them to respond or protect critical infrastructure.  
                                                 
1 Rebecca L. Gonzales, “Transforming Executive Fire Officers a Paradigm Shift to Meet the 
Intelligence Needs of the 21st Century Fire Service” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 
41.  
2 Michael J. Karter, and Gary P. Stein, “U.S. Fire Department Profile through 2013 Fact Sheet, 
National Fire Protection Association, 2013, http://www.nfpa.org/research/reports-and-statistics/the-fire-
service/administration/us-fire-department-profile, 3.  
3 U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and Federal Interagency Committee on 
Emergency Medical Services, 2011 National EMS Assessment (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Emergency Medical Services Division, 
2011).  
4 “U.S and World Population Clock,” U.S. Census Bureau, accessed November 1, 2015, 
http://www.census.gov/popclock/. 
5 Tracy L. Frazzano, and Snyder, G. Matthew, “Hybrid Targeted Violence: Challenging Conventional 
“Active Shooter” Response Strategies,” Homeland Security Affairs 10 (February 2014), article 3, 
https://www.hsaj.org/articles/253.   
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In spite of their expanded role, the fire and EMS personnel across the country 
have yet to consistently incorporate intelligence activities into the daily fire or EMS 
duties. Activities such as the collection and reporting of suspicious activity to 
state/local/tribal/territorial (SLTT) law enforcement, to inform personnel of threat and 
risk and to prepare and potentially prevent attacks must be rolled into the basic 
expectations and duties for fire and EMS personnel. 
Training of fire and EMS personnel to consume and exercise intelligence is 
similar to how the military and law enforcement use intelligence. In all professions, 
intelligence is widely available, and there is a lot of variation on how many personnel in 
each department are trained and on how this information is collected, analyzed, and 
disseminated.  
Based on the examples studied, it seems to be a best practice to restrict decision 
making based on actionable intelligence from the fusion center to a few key senior level 
chief staff per agency. Combined with these key senior level chief officers is the presence 
of a senior fire or EMS agency line officer at the fusion center, whose role is to interpret 
and analyze the information reported and produce actionable intelligence for a specific 
customer base. These highlighted practices are not without costs. The utilization of 
uniformed line officers in the fusion centers will have a cost but the gains of preparedness 
and situational awareness for the fire and EMS personnel overshadow the salary cost. 
One means to incorporate fire and EMS agencies into the information gathering 
and sharing activities is through expanded joint operations with state and local law 
enforcement. Joint operations begin at the mid and upper levels of law enforcement, fire, 
and EMS agencies. As groups begin to share and exchange information, the trust and 
cooperation improves. 
Local cooperation expands to regional and then to the state and federal level 
information sharing and cooperation. As will be outlined below, sharing and exchanging 
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are the fundamentals behind fusion centers. A broad definition of fuse as a verb is “to 
unite or blend into a whole, as if by melting together.”6  
A. FUSION CENTERS 
The predecessor to today’s fusion centers were the terrorism early warning groups 
(TEW and later referred to by the TEWG acronym) and specifically the Los Angeles 
Terrorism Early Warning Group. The LA TEW had its first formal meeting in October 
1996 and grew from “an ad hoc monthly meeting of concerned Los Angeles security 
analysts and emergency responders seeking to share information and build knowledge 
into an incident-specific intelligence fusion cell (actually more of an operations-
intelligence fusion effort).”7  
After the tragic attacks on September 11, 2001 the country had an immediate 
focus on attempting to connect information better to prevent repeat attacks and to remove 
the silos of information long engrained within intelligence agencies. Many law 
enforcement agencies, with a major emphasis on federal, state, and large metropolitan 
departments, were increasingly being expected to prevent, respond to, and investigate 
criminal activities that supported extremist movements and terror groups. 
Just six days after 9/11 attacks, Attorney General John Ashcroft directed each of 
the 93 United States district ’attorney’s to establish an anti-terrorism advisory council 
(ATAC) within their districts. The ’ATACs where “to ensure that effective coordination 
existed to better enable law enforcement to prevent future terrorist acts. Also, they were 
to ensure that effective information sharing systems were put in place that would assist 
public agencies and private entities in being made aware of information that would assist 
them in combatting terrorism.”8 Thomas DiBiagio, U.S. District Attorney for Maryland, 
                                                 
6 Dictonary.Com, s.v. “Fuse,” last modified September 29, 2015, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/fuse?s=t. 
7 John P. Sullivan, and Alain Bauer, Terrorism Early Warning: 10 Years of Achievement in Fighting 
Terrorism and Crime (Los Angeles, CA: Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, 2008), 18. 
8 “Anti-Terrorism: U.S. Attorneys District of Maryland Priorities,” Department of Justice, January 27, 
2015, http://www.justice.gov/usao-md/anti-terrorism. 
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assigned a senior prosecutor as the ATAC coordinator and the Maryland Coordination 
and Analysis Center (MCAC) was opened in November 2003. 
While a lot of emphasis was placed on preventing the errors that allowed the 9/11 
terrorists to be successful, there is no mention of fusion centers in the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002.9 Officially known as Public Law 107-296, the Homeland Security Act 
created the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the cabinet-level position 
of the secretary of homeland security. 
In 2004, the final report from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States, commonly referred to as the 9/11 Commission Report, identified the 
need for a unity of effort amongst government agencies related to intelligence programs 
as a critical recommendation. The 9/11 Commission Report’s main focus, understandably, 
was to break the roadblock of agency silos and to establish a framework that enabled the 
sharing of key terrorism-related intelligence essential to preventing a future terrorist 
attack. 
In October 2007, President George W. Bush released the National Strategy for 
Information Sharing: Successes and Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related 
Information Sharing in which he called for fusion centers to be “the focus…within the 
state and local environment for the receipt and sharing of terrorism information, 
homeland security information, and law enforcement information related to terrorism.”10 
The national strategy outlined the need for fusion center minimum operation standards 
that would allow a baseline level of capability to be established.11 
September 2008, the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security published 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers. This document 
                                                 
9 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat 2135 (2002).  
10 White House, National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (Washington, DC: 
White House, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2012sharingstrategy_1.pdf. 
11 Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs. Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers Majority and Minority 




outlines the basic “structures, processes and tools”12 fusion centers must develop so they 
can effectively and securely share counterterrorism intelligence information with the 
federal government.  
In January 2009, President Barack Obama replaced President George W. Bush, 
and he subsequently replaced Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff with 
Janet Napolitano as secretary. Secretary Napolitano inherited a DHS that was criticized 
for its lack of consistency. One example comes from Bart Johnson, then the Acting 
Undersecretary of DHS Intelligence and Analysis, who publically wrote  
DHS has failed to date to institute a well-coordinated, department-wide 
approach to supporting and interfacing with state and major urban area 
fusion centers…This shortcoming has resulted in a disjointed and ad hoc 
approach by DHS elements toward supporting and interacting with these 
centers.13  
In response, DHS staff proposed “a robust Department-wide initiative to support the 
establishment and sustainment of a nationwide network of fusion centers.”14 This 
initiative advanced forward and fusion centers became one of DHS’s top priorities.  
A fusion center takes on many looks and configurations. In broad description, a 
fusion center is an administrative work space, sponsored by a state or local government, 
that supports the intelligence needs of multiple agencies including; law enforcement 
(state/local/federal), fire/EMS, public health, private sector, and emergency planners 
during steady state and emerging situations. Each fusion center has diverse missions, 
different intelligence capabilities, and varying staffing requirements. No one center is 
alike. 
The fusion center frequently includes a: 
• Watch section that operates 24 hours-a-day and seven days-a-week to 
monitor situational awareness feeds, to receive requests for support, and to 
provide a means to de-conflict information. 
                                                 
12 Department of Homeland Security et al., Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area 
Fusion Centers a Supplement to the Fusion Center Guidelines (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security and Department of Justice, 2008). 1.   
13 Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security, 21.  
14 Ibid., 12. 
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• Intelligence and analysis staff work to gather, analyze, evaluate data, or 
trends (crime, suspicious activity, etc.) that frequently results in a product 
or other information sharing platform. 
• Liaison staff that interact with all sectors, including terrorism liaison 
officers, fusion liaison officers, and intelligence liaison officers in field 
operations. 
• Training staff that establish and deliver a wide assortment of training 
opportunities to enhance awareness and increase connectivity between the 
fusion center and the area of operations. 
Each fusion center is required by federal standards to have established privacy 
policies that outline the collection, synthesis, and sharing of information to protect the 
citizens/residents privacy. It is the joint efforts of the intelligence, analysis, and liaison 
staff that obtain information, tips, leads, and other injects that feed into the suspicious 
activity reporting role.  
To expand the integration of fire and EMS agencies into the fusion center process 
and to correct some shortfalls in prior baseline capabilities, DHS released Fire Service 
Integration for Fusion Centers: An Appendix to the Baseline Capabilities for State and 
Major Urban Area Fusion Centers.15 The document provides recommendations to fusion 
centers on how to effectively fold the fire and EMS agencies into the fusion process. In a 
speech to the 2010 annual Congressional Fire Service Institute Fire and Emergency 
Services Dinner, Secretary Napolitano announced a move to “officially make the fire 
service an official partner in fusion centers, a clearinghouse for terrorist information.”16 
In July 2011, DHS released Implementing 9/11 Commission Report 
Recommendations: Progress Report 2011. The report highlights homeland security 
changes and improvements in intelligence sharing with state and local officials that have 
been made in the United States since the release of the 9/11 report.17 
                                                 
15 Department of Justice, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, and Department of Homeland 
Security, Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers: An Appendix An Appendix to the Baseline 
Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, 2010).  
16 Susan Nicol, “DHS Wants Fire Service to Join Fusion Centers,” Firehouse, April 30, 2010. 
http://www.firehouse.com/news/10467337/dhs-wants-fire-service-to-join-fusion-centers.  
17 Department of Homeland Security, Implementing 9/11 Commission Report Recommendations: 
Progress Report 2011 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2011).  
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As of August 2015, DHS has separated fusion centers18 into two categories, 
primary and recognized. The primary fusion centers serve “as the focal point within the 
state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-
related information…and are the highest priority for the allocation of available federal 
resources.”19 This includes the assignment of personnel from federal agencies and access 
to federal data systems. The 53 primary fusion centers are established with one in each 
state (except Wyoming, which has none), a center in the District of Columbia, and one 
each in the territories of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. In lieu of a 
fusion center, Wyoming utilizes a criminal intelligence center as a component of the 
state’s attorney general’s office as an ad hoc fusion center, and thus it is not classified as 
a primary fusion center.20 
Some states have diverse geographic areas along with multiple major urban areas. 
DHS acknowledges the states’ rights to establish and operate additional centers within 
their state in addition to the primary fusion center. These additional fusion centers are 
frequently referred to locally as intelligence or threat assessment centers and identified by 
DHS as recognized fusion centers. As of August 2015, there are 25 recognized fusion 
centers, spread out over 12 states with six of the recognized fusion centers in Texas and 
five in California.21 All but one of the recognized fusion centers are located in top 40 
metropolitan areas as defined by the United States Census Bureau and the Office of 
Management and Budget.22 The only exception is the El Paso Multi-Agency Tactical 
Response Information Exchange as the El Paso, Texas, metropolitan area ranks sixty-
seventh.  
                                                 
18 For the remainder of this document—the title fusion center will be used synonymous for fusion 
center or regional intelligence centers.  
19 “Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information,” Department of Homeland Security, July 23, 
2015, http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information.  
20 Dana Priest, and William M. Arkin, “Top Secret America: A Washington Post Investigation,” The 
Washington Post, September 2010, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/states/wyoming/.  
21 “Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information,” Department of Homeland Security.  
22 “Annual Estimates of the Resident Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2014—United States—
Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Area,” U.S. Census Bureau, March 2015, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk.  
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Figure 1.  Locations of the Fusion Centers in the 48 Contiguous States 
 
Source “Fusion Centers,” National Fusion Center Association, accessed October 20, 
2015, https://nfcausa.org/default.aspx?act=directorymap.aspx&menugroup=Map.  
There are three primary federal grant sources that support fusion center 
operations: DHS Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), FEMA Urban Area 
Security Initiative (UASI), and Department of Justice (DOJ) Justice Assistance Grants 
(JAG). These grants are utilized to supplement the SLTT funding that forms the base of 
the fusion center support and operations. In attempts to quantify the federal funding that 
has been directed to developing and supporting fusion centers form 2003 to 2011, the 
2012 Senate Investigative Committee places the range at between $289 million and $1.4 
billion.23  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Fire and EMS providers are critical components in homeland security. 
Unfortunately, the vast majority of these providers are untapped or under-utilized as 
submitters of suspicious activity reports. The approaches for outreach, interaction, and 
                                                 
23 Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security, 3. 
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education that have been effective to law enforcement since 9/11 do not cross over to the 
fire and EMS community as each group’s mission varies greatly. 
The fire and EMS community have unique challenges that are often presented as 
limitations to expanding the role of fire and EMS providers in intelligence gathering; 
however, there are a few examples where fire and EMS providers have been integrated 
into the intelligence gathering. The success and challenges from these fusion centers must 
be analyzed and best practices shared with other fusion centers and fire and EMS 
community organizations. These practices must be assessed for the fiscal impact of 
implementation to the fusion center sponsoring agency. This presents an opportunity for 
researchers to examine examples of existing fusion centers and identify lessons to be 
learned. 
C. THESIS QUESTION 
This thesis will examine the current outreach systems to fire and EMS agencies in 
place at selected fusion centers or regional intelligence centers. The primary research 
questions are: 
• What has occurred since 2001 to integrate fire and EMS agencies in the 
information sharing and collaboration process performed by fusion 
centers?  
• What forms of outreach, interaction, and education programs are used by 
specified fusion centers to interact with fire and EMS agencies? 
D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II provides the literature review for the thesis. As the field of homeland 
security in the current sense and use of the word is new, the depth of material is limited. 
Literature on fusion centers and the integration of fire and EMS personnel is mainly 
limited to government documents and academic studies respectively. The methodology 
utilized for study is highlighted at the end of Chapter II. 
In Chapter III, the selected fusion centers are profiled and initial comparisons 
created through information presented in a series of tables and graphs to outline the 
center’s operation, structure, outreach, and suspicious activity reporting format. Chapter 
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IV provides in-depth comparison of how the fusion centers approach the liaison, to fire 
and EMS agencies, function differently. This ranges from the title used for the liaison 
role to the number of liaisons from each fire or EMS agency. Chapter V looks closely at 
the number of responders and fire and EMS departments served by each fusion center and 
how this plays a role in the effectiveness of outreach, interaction, and education.  
Chapter VI outlines specific practices and implementation strategies for effective 
outreach, interaction, and education that can be jointly adapted by both the fusion centers 
as well as the fire and EMS agencies in the center’s area of responsibility. Implementing 
these practices and strategies would result in a higher level of outreach, interaction, and 
education to fire and EMS agencies and should be priorities for all fusion centers and fire 
and EMS agencies. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The majority of the sources evaluated for this review are academic sources on fire, EMS, 
public health, and various elements of the public safety community’s involvement in the 
collective war on terror. The other major body of literature is the guidance documents 
that provide the framework for the establishment and operation of fusion centers. The 
research literature regarding integration of fire and EMS personnel into intelligence 
gathering can be categorized into five categories areas: 
• Academic literature supporting fire service intelligence integration 
• Academic literature supporting health and EMS involvement in fusion 
centers 
• Fusion center operational and guidance documentation 
• Fire service member organization terrorism/intelligence guidance 
documents 
• Government reports and findings 
Among the literature reviewed for this project, five themes emerged as the most 
important: 
• Evolution of literature 
• Availability of fire and EMS personnel 
• Impact on fire and EMS perception in the community 
• Legal basis for fire and EMS observation and reporting 
• Fusion center inclusion of fire and EMS personnel 
A. EVOLUTION OF LITERATURE 
There is a clear distinction of academic literature written before and after the 
establishment and startup of the Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise (FSIE) in 2006. The 
mission of the FSIE is to “establish an institutionalized Fire Service information and 
intelligence sharing framework that will enhance the preparedness level of fire 
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departments across the country while supporting the prevention, protection, response, and 
recovery efforts of all homeland security partners.”24 
Many of the academic literature sources in 2008 and 2009 highlight the faults of 
the fusion center process and the lack of oversight and high-level federal support for fire 
and EMS representation in the intelligence cycle. The academic literature written 
between 2009 and 2013 captures the creation of the FSIE, but it also highlights the 
demise and now the formal dissolving of the FSIE. The authors of this later academic 
literature capture how the fire and EMS community was on the right track with the FSIE 
but that activity has stalled greatly after the FSIE dissolved. Joshua Dennis in his 2012 
NPS thesis “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants” best lays this out with three high level 
factors: reduced engagement due to budget limitations; advancement of key stakeholders 
in the FSIE development; and the inability to achieve consensus amongst the various fire 
service interest groups.25 
The predominance of the guidance documents on the creation of fusion centers 
are from the early and mid-2000s. The 2001 PATRIOT Act is an example of this early 
reactive literature. The 2012 National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding 
is an example of later literature.26 As experience has been used to modify the operation 
and structure of the fusion centers, supplemental documents have been produced to build 
on the earlier documents, including the 2010 Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers: 
An Appendix to the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion 
Centers.27 Over roughly a six-year period, the fusion center guidance documents 
transform from no mention of fire and EMS personnel to the need to incorporate both 
groups into the fusion center. This transformation demonstrates increased inclusion and 
broader acceptance of non-law enforcement partners in the fusion centers. 
                                                 
24 Bryan Heirston, “Terrorism Prevention and Firefighters: Where are The Information-Sharing 
Boundaries?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 31. 
25 Joshua M. Dennis, “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Where Do we Go from Here to Bring the 
Fire Service into the Domestic Intelligence Community?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2012), 5. 
26 White House, National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding.   
27 Department of Justice, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, and Department of Homeland 
Security, Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers.  
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B. AVAILABILITY OF FIRE AND EMS PERSONNEL 
One element that repeats throughout many of the literature sources is the presence and 
availability of fire and EMS personnel to be intelligence gathers or first preventers28 at 
the same time as they serve as the first responders. Many of the authors outline how fire 
and EMS personnel are present in the community and towns performing their daily duties 
and how that presents enormous opportunity for observing activities and behaviors of 
suspicious activity. There is some discussion of existing programs aimed at collecting 
this data but none goes further into analyzing quality of data collected; nor are there any 
examples found of how this data is applied and disseminated. For instance, in her thesis, 
Rebecca Gonzales ties how the general citizen is expected to See Something and Say 
Something, as a force multiplier, that all fire and EMS personnel must be included in the 
intelligence collaboration.29  
C. IMPACT ON FIRE AND EMS PERCEPTION IN THE COMMUNITY 
The public perception of the ethics of using fire and EMS personnel for reporting 
of suspicious activity is debated in the literature. A study of 32 chiefs conducted by 
Richard Blatus resulted in 82 percent reporting that the fire fighters’ image in the 
community would be diminished if they were trained to “recognize non-traditional forms 
of terrorist threats.”30  
Some in academic literature, including the theses of Blatus and Gonzales, outline 
current practices in place for fire fighters to report illegal activity they observe during the 
regular course of incident response and daily activities. These include drug activity, drug 
paraphernalia, and drug production or processing along with the presences of firearms 
and fireworks. 
                                                 
28 Gonzales, “Transforming Executive Fire Officers a Paradigm Shift,” 4. 
29 Ibid., 38. 
30 Richard J. Blatus, “Altering the Mission Statement the Training of Firefighters as Intelligence 
Gatherers” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 8, 19. 
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A second core issue in the use of fire and EMS personnel as intelligence gathers is 
the “sacred trust” established at the patient and medical provider level.31 This trust is 
created between the patient and provider, similar to the trust one has to talk to his or her 
primary physician, and is perceived by the public to be private. 
The core element to combat the concerns about perception is open and 
progressive communication with the community. As Blatus writes in his thesis, educating 
the community will greatly alleviate the possibility of concerns from the community. 
Furthermore, the community operates under a general pre-standing expectation that fire 
fighters report activity and materials “deemed to be potentially dangerous to the 
community”32 like elder or child abuse. The expectation for fire fighters to report dangers 
to the community is broadly the norm across the country. 
D. LEGAL BASIS FOR FIRE AND EMS OBSERVATION AND REPORTING 
A key difference between the legal basis for law enforcement entry into private 
property and that of the fire and EMS service is the presence of exigent circumstances. 
The most general description of exigent circumstances includes any situation where 
people are in imminent danger.33 The fire and EMS basis for imminent danger is applied 
to structures on fire, structures threatened by a hazardous material leak or from pending 
structural compromise or collapse, or the immediate need for medical treatment and 
interventions. Through several rulings, the Supreme Court has validated the actions of 
fire departments entering private properly during the course of incident response and the 
subsequent discovery of illegal activity.34 
Tied into the legal basis for entry into private property is the legal basis for 
identification and seizure of items in plain view. Fire and EMS personnel who enter a 
structure for incident mitigation and observe items in plain view (not behind closed doors 
                                                 
31 Malcolm Kemp, “Expanding the Role of Emergency Medical Services in Homeland Security” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 27. 
32 Blatus, “Altering the Mission Statement the Training of Firefighters,” 25. 
33 Wikipedia, s.v., “Exigent Circumstance in United States Law,” accessed November 20, 2014, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exigent_circumstance. 
34 Heirston, “Terrorism Prevention and Firefighters,” 8. 
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of closets or cabinets or in boxes) are permitted by case law to report such items to local 
law enforcement.35  
In conjunction with the legal basis for observing and reporting suspicious activity 
is the legal requirement of the duty to act.36 These duties to act are prescribed in the 
medical protocol and/or medical licensure agencies for EMS personnel. The traditional 
form of duty to act is the initiation and continuation of treatment to a patient, 
notwithstanding factors of prejudice or the patient’s social, race, or economic standing.  
E. FUSION CENTER INCLUSION OF FIRE AND EMS PERSONNEL 
The first document that outlines the inclusion of fire and EMS personnel in the 
protection of the homeland is the 9/11 Commission Report, published in 2004. The 
Commission commission’s report lumps fire and EMS personnel into the broader 
category of frontline personnel, but does not specifically examine their role in 
intelligence gathering.37 Frontline personnel include local law enforcement, fire and 
EMS personnel, public health staff, public transportation, as well as emergency 
management personnel. 
In 2006, the involvement of the fire and EMS services grew by leaps and bounds 
as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) created the FSIE, via the Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis. Many of the documents that support the FSIE, including the 
FSIE Concept Plan, FSIE National Strategy 2008, and the FSIE Intelligence 
Requirements, outlined the key capabilities fire and EMS personnel provide in the 
information gathering process.38 A critical flaw outlined in two sources, Blatus and 
Dennis, is that the FSIE focuses on fire and EMS personnel’s involvement at the 
                                                 
35 Colonnade Corp. V. United States, 397 U.S 71, Colonnade Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S 711970). 
36 Kemp, “Expanding the Role of Emergency Medical Services in Homeland Security,” 29. 
37 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: Norton, 
2004), 426. 
38 Dennis, “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants,” 4.  
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information sharing process while excluding them from the critical steps of the 
intelligence process: defining requirements, recognition, and gathering intelligence.39  
The 2010 DHS Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers: An Appendix to the 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers was a second 
significant step forward to normalizing the inclusion of the fire and EMS service 
involvement in fusion centers and information exchange. The appendix adds elements to 
the operations of the fusion centers and highlights how fire and EMS agencies can be 
integrated to assist fusion centers and how fusion centers can assist fire and EMS 
agencies.40 
1. Examples of Fire and EMS Providers’ Involvement in Suspicious 
Activity Reporting  
As noted, some in the fire and EMS community are resistant to tarnishing the 
image of the fire and EMS personnel to the eyes of the community that they serve by 
expanding into the role of information reporting. Parallel to the resistance to impact the 
community trust is a lack of understanding of what type of incidents or information the 
fire and EMS personnel can contribute to the fusion center suspicious activity reporting. 
Outlined below are two examples of everyday occurrences that fire and EMS 
personnel encountered, how reporting one led to the investigation and possible disruption 
of a terror plan, and how a report was delayed, which could have altered the course of a 
case. 
a. Case 1 
The first case is from a National Capital Region fire department in 2013. A fire 
department inspector observed a full-scale commercial jet flight simulator in a stand-a-
lone closet in an auto repair shop during the course of his annual inspection. The 
inspector reported the observations to the local fusion center, which immediately passed 
                                                 
39 Blatus, “Altering the Mission Statement the Training of Firefighters;” Dennis, “Standing on the 
Shoulders of Giants.”  
40 Department of Justice, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, and Department of Homeland 
Security, Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers, 8.        
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the report details onto local law enforcement. The local law enforcement (LE) conducted 
a site visit and a rapid interview of the shop owner. The local LE task force officer 
provided an investigation update back to the fusion center and additional follow-up 
occurred by federal LE.41 
b. Case 2 
The second case occurred in January 2015 in the National Capital Region at scene 
of a structure fire incident. An adult male approached fire fighters preparing the apparatus 
to depart the scene. The male stated he was a rescuer from a foreign country, and he 
wanted to know more about United States firefighting in order to take the information 
back to his home country.  
The firefighter provided the interest party with several options to obtain 
information, from joining a volunteer department to a station tour to a ride-a-long. In 
response to the offers, the male responded that he did not want a tour or ride-a-long but 
desired a weekly interaction to share his experience and learn U.S. firefighting actions. 
During the exchange, the male mentioned that he had stopped at numerous area fire 
stations and that no one would help him.  
When the male was asked for contact information so the firefighter could attempt 
to follow up, the male refused and walked away. Once a report of this event was 
submitted to the fire liaison in the fusion center and distributed to area fire department 
points of contact (POCs), four additional stations/personnel reported contact with a male 
with the same physical description and actions.42 
In both cases, the fire and EMS personnel actions reflect recognition of indicators 
and behaviors. After the firefighters recognized the abnormal actions, they took action 
according to set procedures and notified the local fusion center fire liaison. Follow up 
interaction with local fusion center and law enforcement personnel enhances the ability to 
                                                 
41 Jared Goff, email message to author, April 16, 2015. 
42 Ibid.  
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utilize established resources, conduct analysis, and report suspicious activity through 
standard policies.  
Case 1 represents a situation that could be consistent with the indicator or 
behavior category of “aviation activity, learning to operate...an aircraft that poses a threat 
of harm to people or property and that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other 
criminality in a reasonable person.”43 Case 2 illustrates a situation that requires additional 
vetting and investigation, is consistent with the indicator/behavior of “eliciting 
information, beyond mere curiosity”44 and “acquisition of expertise, by attempting to 
gain knowledge or skills in a manner that arouse suspicion.”45 
F. AREAS REMAINING UNKNOWN—AREAS OF FURTHER STUDY 
In a focus group led by Blatus, two new research questions focusing on the 
inclusion of fire and EMS personnel were raised:46 
• Would requiring recipients of federal anti-terrorism grant funding, 
including fire and EMS personnel, to become trained in the recognizing, 
identifying, and reporting of terrorist indicators and behaviors result in 
better reporting and inclusion of fire and EMS personnel? 
• Would fire and EMS personnel training increase if DHS imposed 
sanctions on current federal grant funding recipients that did not include 
fire and EMS personnel in established information reporting processes?47  
While reviewing the literature, two additional areas for further study became 
clear: 
• What replaced the FSIE? Did the FSIE dissolve due to the planned 
increased involvement by the national member organizations or due to the 
lack of funding and support of fire and EMS personnel involved in 
information submission?   
                                                 
43 Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice, Suspicious Activity Reporting Indicators 
and Examples (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2015), https://nsi.ncirc.gov/documents/ISE-
SAR_functional_standard_indicators_and_examples_0315.pdf.  
44 Ibid.   
45 Ibid.  
46 Blatus, “Altering the Mission Statement the Training of Firefighters,” 26.  
47 Ibid.  
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• What are the common elements of suspicious activity reporting in-use by 
fire departments today? Does the size of the fire or EMS organization/ or 
department impact the use of fire and EMS personnel as information 
gathers and reporters? 
In reviewing the literature that argues for the use of fire and EMS personnel as 
information gathers and reporters, two primary issues arise. The first questions revolved 
around the legal basis for fire and EMS personnel to be information reporters. The second 
is what infrastructure is required within each fire and EMS agency to support the 
information reporting activity. 
The literature is very helpful in laying out the past assessment of the operating 
picture of the incorporation of fire and EMS personnel in the net of public safety 
professionals protecting the United States. The vast majority of fire and EMS agencies 
lack the infrastructure and support mechanisms inherent to law enforcement to receive, 
synthesize, and distribute the products from fusion centers or other intelligence sources. 
This is largely due to the lack of necessity to do so and traditional roles and 
responsibilities already established for fire and EMS. While fire and EMS agencies have 
clearly defined processed for protecting patient medical records, they lack the culture and 
work process to handle sensitive or secure intelligence and security information. Many of 
the issues identified in the early literature that have limited the integration of fire and 
EMS personnel still remain today, possibly due to the primary focus being on other 
elements of the intelligence puzzle.  
G. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis will be a qualitative comparative analysis that focuses on the core 
components of outreach, interaction, and education by selected fusion centers toward fire 
and EMS agencies. Currently, there are 78 fusion centers, 46 of which have a mission 
area in the fire service. For the purpose of this thesis, five fusion centers were identified 
as a focus for case studies through questioning senior fire and EMS service leaders as 
fusion centers with effective outreach, interaction, and education programs to and with 
fire and EMS agencies. 
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The five selected centers are: 
1. Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC) 
2. Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center (LA JRIC) 
3. Southern Nevada Counter Terrorism Center (SNCTC) 
4. Southwest Texas Fusion Center (SWTFC) 
5. Northern Virginia Regional Intelligence Center (NVRIC) 
The study will only focus on outreach to fire and EMS agencies. Fusion center 
outreach to law enforcement, public health, utilities, or other critical infrastructure/key 
resource community partners will not be included for study. The research initially started 
with a review of annual reports and governance documents from each fusion center. 
These documents (typically strategic plans, center governance agreements, or operational 
doctrine) outline the centers operational requirements, threat assessment, intelligence 
requirements, and operational procedures and provide information pertaining to fire and 
EMS outreach, interaction, and education programs. 
A data capture form for historical and factual information was developed and sent 
to each fusion center (see example in Appendix A). The data capture form ascertained 
geographic data for each center’s area of responsibility, structure and staffing style, 
operation and outreach programs, and a description of the center’s suspicious activity 
reporting procedures. 
During research, a sixth fusion center, the San Diego Law Enforcement 
Coordination Center (SDLECC), was identified as effective on “regularly publishing 
products for the emergency services community and their applicability to fire and EMS” 
by the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security majority staff report 
on the National Network of Fusion Centers.48 The author attempted to contact the 
SDLECC to request a copy of the data capture form, but without success. 
                                                 
48 United States House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Majority Staff Report on 
the National Network of Fusion Centers, 113th Cong. (2013), (56), 
https://www.archives.gov/isoo/oversight-groups/sltps-pac/staff-report-on-fusion-networks-2013.pdf.   
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The information obtained from the data capture form, the published annual 
reports, and center governance documents was analyzed using the appreciative inquiry 4-
D cycle analytical method. The 4-Ds stand for: 
• Discover—dialog among people, often via interviews, to find the most 
effective points or when the organization is at its best. 
• Dream—allowing group members to envision the team or organization at 
its peak. 
• Design—a small group embodied to form the team or organization as 
envisioned in the dream. 
• Destiny—implementing the changes out outlined in the dream and 
formatted during the design. 
The thesis will present a list of highlighted practices for fusion center outreach, 
interaction, and education programs to fire and EMS agencies. Fusion center 
management can utilize the practices to modify its outreach and interaction programs by 
incorporating highlighted models and/or programs. 
H. CLOSING 
The literature outlining the integration of fire and EMS personnel into intelligence 
gathering has evolved in the 14 years since 9/11. Many of the early obstructions to fire 
and EMS personnel involvement, including legal basis and community perception, have 
been openly discussed and are no-longer distractors. The federal government guidance on 
information and intelligence sharing and the inclusion of sectors outside of law 
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III. FUSION CENTER DESCRIPTION 
The fusion centers selected for analysis in this thesis where strategically selected 
to represent fusion centers with effective outreach, interaction, and education programs. 
Conversations with senior fire and EMS agency subject matter experts led to the selection 
of the fusion centers (ACTIC, LA JRIC, SNCTC, SWTFC, NVRIC). Four of the five 
fusion centers studied are recognized fusion centers, as discussed in Chapter II; only the 
ACTIC is a DHS designated primary fusion center.  
Each fusion center completed a data capture form that collected historical and 
factual information about the center. The form focused on specific elements of the fusion 
center structure and outreach: 
• Geographic data for the center’s area of responsibility allows for the size 
and magnitude of the area covered, the number of residents protected, the 
number of fire and EMS agencies, and the number of fire and EMS 
providers/personnel. This set of data is utilized to compare similar and dis-
similar data points.  
• Fusion center age and sponsoring agency data points are utilized to 
compare the age and experience of the fusion center for established 
procedures and processes while the sponsoring agency data point is used 
to compare the role/position in the broader federal, state, local, territorial, 
and tribal spectrum of government agency. 
• Governance, baseline, and staffing data points are analyzed to identify if 
the fusion center’s outreach, interaction, and education is influenced by 
specific variables.  
• Outreach methods and communication style and frequency data points 
establish the style and method by which each fusion center interaction 
with the fire and EMS agenesis in their Area of Responsibility (AOR). 
These data points are reviewed to identify trends or similar formats that 
associate with the effective practices. 
The selected centers are resulted in a heavy west coast predominance (see Figure 2). 
Three centers are in U.S. Census Bureau west statistical region. The LA JRIC is in the 
Pacific division, and the SNCTC and ACTIC are in the mountain division. The remaining 
two centers fall within the Census Bureau’s south statistical region. The SWTFC is in the 
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west south central division, and the NVRIC is in the south Atlantic division.49 The fusion 
centers serve major metropolitan areas and rank in the top 50 metropolitan areas of the 
United States, according to the 2012 U.S. Census Bureau core based statistical area 
rankings.50 
 
Figure 2.  Map of Fusion Centers Utilized for Comparative Analysis 
 
Source: Sarah Ierely, email to author, September 14, 2015. 
A. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY 
Each fusion center has an established AOR. The term AOR originates from U.S. 
military planning for pre-defined geographic regions assigned to commanders who had 
the authority to defend and protect the specified area. Similarly, AOR has been applied 
thought out the federal, state and local government level as a practical means to define 
service areas for specific agencies. One example is the specified AOR for each of the 56 
                                                 
49 “Census Regions and Divisions of the United States,” U.S. Census Bureau, accessed September 1, 
2015, http://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf. 
50 “Annual Estimates of the Population of Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas: April 1, 
2010 to July 1, 2012,” United States Census Bureau, March 2013, 
http://www.census.gov/popest/data/metro/totals/2012/tables/CBSA-EST2012-01.csv. 
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Federal Bureau of Investigations field offices.51 Table 1 outlines the selected fusion 
center AOR, size in square miles and number of residents.52 
Table 1.   Selected Fusion Center Area of Responsibility  
Fusion 





ACTIC The entire state of Arizona including the Phoenix-
Mesa-Glendale, Tucson-Nogales, Prescott, Lake 
Havasu City-Kingman, Yuma, and Flagstaff 
metropolitan statistical areas. 
114,000 6.7 
LA JRIC The greater Los Angeles area consisting of the 
counties of: Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San 
Bernardino, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, and 
Ventura along with all the cities inside the 
counties. 
40,000 18 
SNCTC  The Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise metropolitan 
statistical area including the cities of Boulder City, 
Henderson, Las Vegas, North Las Vegas, and 
Clark County. 
8,000 1.5 
SWTFC Central Texas from San Antonio south to the 
Mexico border. 
1,240 2.3 
NVRIC The communities of northern Virginia adjacent to 
the nation’s capital. The counties of Arlington, 
Fairfax, Loudoun, Prince William, and the city of 




As a natural tie to the large metropolitan areas served by the fusion centers, the 
fire and EMS agencies served by the fusion centers assemble into formidable public 
safety strength. Table 2 highlights the number of fire and EMS agencies and number of 
fire and EMS providers supported by each fusion center 
                                                 
51 Ibid.  
52 Unless indicated otherwise, numbers in table provided by data capture form. 
53 Number of residents in millions. 
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Table 2.   Fire and EMS Agencies Supported by Fusion Centers 
Fusion Center Number of Fire & EMS 
Agencies 
Number of Fire & 
EMS Providers54 
ACTIC 66 Unknown 
LA JRIC 124 23,000 
SNCTC 9 2,600 
SWTFC 35 Unknown 
NVRIC 11 5,000 
B. CENTER AGE AND SPONSOR 
The five fusion centers age range from the early TEWG days to relatively new 
startups less than 10 years old. In addition, each fusion center is sponsored by a 
local/municipal law enforcement agency. Furthermore, these fusion centers are all located 
in facilities with singular law enforcement missions and the majority being in stand-alone 
structures not directly affiliated with the host law enforcement traditional police station 
environment and not co-located with elements of the local fire and EMS agencies. Table 
3 outlines the age of each studied fusion center along with the centers sponsoring agency. 
Table 3.   Fusion Center Age, Sponsoring Agency, and Located with 
Fire/EMS 








ACTIC 2004 Arizona Department of Public 
Safety 
No 
LA JRIC 1999 Los Angeles County Sherriff 
Department  
No 
SNCTC 2007 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 
Department 
No 
SWTFC 2007 San Antonio Police Department No 
NVRIC 2004 Fairfax County Police 
Department 
No 
54 An accurate number of fire and EMS providers in the fusion center AOR is a constantly changing 
number. Each fusion center provided approximation numbers based upon their last internal survey or 
general department information. 
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C. GOVERNANCE AND STAFFING 
All five fusion centers have representation of the fire and EMS agency in the 
fusion center governance organization as well as dedicated representation of a uniformed 
staff member from the local fire and EMS agency in the fusion center. Four of the five 
centers have dedicated fire and EMS analyst, and the fifth uses an analytical section that 
shares information among the center agency partners (see Table 4).  
Table 4.   Fusion Center Governance and Staffing 






ACTIC Yes Yes No 
LA JRIC Yes Yes Yes 
SNCTC  Yes Yes Yes 
SWTFC Yes Yes Yes 
NVRIC Yes No Yes 
 
In comparison only 50 percent of fusion centers (39 of the 78 centers) have fire 
service as a component in their fusion centers multidisciplinary governance as outlined in 
the 2014 National Network of Fusion Center’s final report.55 The National Network 
report summarizes the fusion center performance program evaluations. 
D. BASELINE REQUIREMENTS 
As discussed in Chapter I, in April 2010 DHS published the Fire Service 
Integration for Fusion Centers: An Appendix to the Baseline Capabilities for State and 
Major Urban Area Fusion Centers. The report notes that without clearly identified 
requests for information or intelligence requirements, the fusion center analysts are 
limited in their ability to highlight information as valuable to fire and EMS personnel.56 
Table 5 outlines how each of the selected fusion centers reported utilizing the baseline 
Intel requirements. 
                                                 
55 Department of Homeland Security, 2014 National Network of Fusion Centers: Final Report 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2015), viii. 
56 Department of Justice, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, and Department of Homeland 
Security, Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers.  
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Table 5.   Baseline Intel Requirements 
Fusion Center Fire & EMS Baseline Intel Requirements 
ACTIC Not Reported 
LA JRIC Yes 




E. LIAISON MODEL 
A core mission of the fusion center is aggregating and then dispersing of threat-
related information amongst federal and SLLT partners; how each center configures its 
outreach training and information exchange model is critical. A general model of 
outreach is the liaison officer (LO) with various names or prefixes. Three common 
prefixes are terrorism (TLO), fusion (FLO), and intelligence (ILO), each with separate 
scoping issues and associated connotations. The specifics of the title and the impact on 
outreach and interaction with residents and business professionals will be highlighted in 
Chapter IV along with two vastly different models of outreach evident by the significant 
disparity in the number of trained personnel. Table 6 breaks out which outreach model 
each center utilizes and the number of trained personnel. 
Table 6.   Outreach Model and Number of Trained Personnel 
Fusion Center Model Number of Training Fire/EMS 
Personnel 
ACTIC TLO 40057 
LA JRIC TLO 1,50058 
SNCTC  FLO 1,900 
SWTFC TLO 3 
NVRIC TLO 26 
 
                                                 
57 The ACTIC data figure for number of fire and EMS personnel in Figure 6 reflects the active TLO 
personnel. Over 1,200 personnel have been trained per the ACTIC.  
58 The LA JRIC data figure for number of fire and EMS personnel in Figure 6 is based upon the last 
three years. Accurate figures prior to 2012 are unavailable. 
 29 
The 2014 National Network of Fusion Centers final report highlights that only 40 centers 
have liaison officer participation from the EMS discipline and 59 centers report liaison 
officer participation from fire service organizations.59 
F. COMMUNICATION AND INTERACTION/OUTREACH 
The means and frequency by which the fusion center communicates is related to 
the style of liaison outreach and number of trained personnel from the fire and EMS 
agencies serviced by the fusion center. This is accomplished utilizing a mix of formats 
and styles of communication, including meetings, conference calls, video conferences, 
regular bulletins, special event/threat bulletins, and emails (see Table 7).  
Table 7.   Format of Communication/Interaction with Fire/EMS 
Agencies 
Fusion Center Format(s) Frequency 
ACTIC Email bulletins 
 




LA JRIC Email bulletins 
 











Weekly and recurring 
 
SWTFC Email bulletins 
 
Meetings—Assorted 
2 to 5 times a week 
 
Recurring 









The response on the fusion center data capture form for the frequency of 
communication revealed that some centers distribute a daily bulletin while the remaining 
utilize just-in-time, situational dependent and a weekly digest. The responses on the data 
                                                 
59 Department of Homeland Security, 2014 National Network of Fusion Centers, viii. 
 30 
form related to meetings and other forms of dynamic two-way communication grouped 
mainly in a general category of recurring. This ranges from weekly, to bi-monthly, to 
monthly, and to quarterly. As noted in Table 1, the AORs for the fusion centers ranged 
from just over 1,000 square miles for the NVRIC to roughly 114,000 for the ACTIC. This 
demonstrates the vast differences of a regional center (the NVRIC) and the state 
designated and DHS primary fusion center (the ACTIC). 
In addition to communications from the fusion center to the fire and EMS 
agencies, each center performs in-person outreach to the departments in its AOR. The 
forms and frequency of outreach are summarized in Table 8. The distinction between 
communication in Table 7 and outreach in Table 8 lies with the communication mainly 
pushed one-way from the fusion center (Table 7) while outreach is two-way interactive 
sessions between the fusion center fire and EMS analysis or liaisons and the fire and 
EMS agency representatives and/or personnel (Table 8). Meetings differ from both 
communication and outreach. Table 9 lists the frequency of meetings by each fusion 
center. More detail about the size of the AOR and the style of outreach and meetings will 
be discussed in Chapter V. 
Table 8.   Outreach Frequency and Methods 
Fusion Center Frequency Method 
ACTIC 1 per week E-mail bulletins 
LA JRIC Daily E-mail bulletins 
SNCTC  1 per week E-mail bulletins 
SWTFC 2 to 5 per week E-mail bulletins 
NVRIC 1 to 2 per week E-mail bulletins 
Table 9.   Meeting Cycle/Frequency 
Fusion Center Regular Meetings Frequency 
ACTIC Yes Once a week 
LA JRIC Yes  
SNCTC  Yes Weekly 
SWTFC Yes  





The data capture form obtained a large amount of historical and factual 
information about each of the five fusion centers. The data ranged from geographic and 
demographics describing each fusion center’s AOR as well as the size of the fire and 
EMS agencies while the fusion center and sponsoring agency data outlined the age and 
support structure for each center. As each fusion center is different the governance, 
baseline intelligence, and staffing data points provide information that influence the 
centers outreach methods, frequency, and format. A combination of geographic and 
demographic data along with the style and format outreach, specifically the liaison officer 







THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 33 
IV. LIAISON FUNCTIONS 
As outlined in Chapter III, the selected five fusion centers provide support to 
communities from different areas across the country and serve metropolitan areas ranging 
from just over one million people to close to 20 million. The number of fire and EMS 
personnel parallels the population of the fusion center AOR and ranges from 2,500 
personnel to an estimate of 23,000 for the LA JRIC. 
This chapter focuses on the title and role of the liaison officers by each of the 
fusion centers. This highlights important differences in how the outreach occurs in 
difference fusion centers; however, regardless of title, each center is effective with its 
style of outreach. 
A. LIAISON OFFICERS 
As first mentioned in Chapter III and portrayed in Figure 6, the liaison officer is 
primarily responsible for outreach. A description of each officer (TLO, FLO, and ILO) 
can be founding the following sections. The key concerns about the liaison officers can 
be categorized into name/title and the quantity of liaisons within each agency. 
1. Terrorism Liaison Officer 
As TWEGs continued and anti-terrorism advisory councils (ATACs) developed 
followed by the early fusion centers, the title for the local point of contact from the police 
or fire and EMS agency to the collective fusion center family first was coined as 
terrorism liaison officer (TLO). As defined by the Terrorism Liaison Officer Network, a 
TLO is “not necessarily an expert in terrorism,” but the “principal point of contact for a 
public safety agency in matters related to terrorism information.”60 Additional research 
reveals that the TLO terms originates back to 2005 California Commission on Peace 
Officer Standards and the 2006 Training Terrorism Liaison Officer program.61 
                                                 
60 “What is a Terrorism Liaison Officer,” Terrorism Liaison Officer Information Network, September 
21, 2015, http://tlo.org/what_is_tlo.html.  
61 “Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Program: Public,” Public Intelligence, August 10, 2010, 
https://publicintelligence.net/terrorism-liaison-officer-tlo-program/#footnote_1_14471. 
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As TLOs began watching and reporting anomalous activity they soon discovered 
being titled a “terrorism liaison officer” implied their role was focused on terrorism. This 
created problems, conflicts, and inserted barriers to effective outreach as these liaison 
officers where perceived to only work on terror and limited the officer’s ability to build a 
sense of trust with organizations and personnel. 
2. Fusion Liaison Officer 
A derivative to the TLO is the prefix of fusion—coined the fusion liaison officer 
(FLO). This evolution broadened the scope and role of the liaison officer to receiving, 
analyzing, gathering, and sharing of data that is used to fuse information and, ultimately, 
create intelligence. Moving away from the terrorism title removed the connotation of 
only focusing on violent or dangerous activities that threaten people or governments; 
however, term “fusion” is not widely understood by the public. 
While the basic definition of fusion is “a merging of diverse, distinct, or separate 
elements into a unified whole,”62 when joined together with liaison officer the role and 
scope of the FLO is often misunderstood outside the fusion center community. As 
reported by one fusion center, during outreach activities with local religious groups and 
leaders, the liaison officer frequently has to clarify his or her role and scope as the term 
fusion is not understood.63 As the prefix terrorism brings about negative connotations and 
erects barriers to communication the prefix of fusion creates ambiguity. 
3. Intelligence Liaison Officer 
A second derivative of the TLO is the intelligence liaison officer (ILO). The 
terrorism or fusion prefix is replaced with intelligence, which both separates from the 
message and connotations of terrorism and the frequently misunderstood term fusion. 
Along with the change in prefix comes the escalation in involvement and the level of the 
authority for fire or EMS agency.  
                                                 
62 Merriam-Webster, s.v., “Fusion,” last modified September 25, 2015. http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/fusion.  
63 Evan Hannah, personal communication to author, July 9, 2015. 
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In the NVRIC model, the ILO is the agency point of contact for information and 
intelligence push and pull with the fusion center. This individual is frequently a senior 
level department chief or executive staff that has the department head’s approval to 
represent the department at the fusion center. This allows for the building of a community 
of trust among the ILOs and the fusion center staff. For the NVRIC, this role resides with 
the agency special operations chiefs.  
The NVRIC utilizes the ILO with its multiple public and private sector partners, 
as it seeks the further integration of separate sector intelligence roles. As part of outreach 
efforts, the ILO works with the Health Security Intelligence Enterprise (HSIE), similar to 
the FSIE. The HSIE was pushed by the DHS Office of Health Affairs in conjunction with 
the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis as a means to reach into the public health 
and healthcare organizations to increase awareness of health security information sharing. 
B. BASIC TERRORISM AWARENESS  
While the studied fusion centers provide TLO, FLO, or ILO training to a wide 
group of recipients based upon their specific outreach model, a consistent level of basic 
terrorism awareness is not universally offered. The key element to utilizing the 
responders from fire and EMS agencies as information reporters is the ability to 
recognize the specific terrorism behaviors and indicators. For instance, the fire and EMS 
providers may observe a materials storage area of items and components that can be used 
for bomb making; they could observe bystanders photographing incident scenes or 
critical infrastructure elements, or persons the testing and probing of security. These 
activities alone may not indicate illegal activity but may be precursors or planning steps 
to a terror plot. Given the collection of data for this research, it is safe to assume that the 
nearly two million fire and EMS responders across the country have not received a 
formal, base level of awareness to the indicators and examples of suspicious activity.64  
                                                 
64 Bureau of Justice Assistance, Suspicious Activity Reporting Indicators and Examples.  
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C. STAFFING MODEL 
Another use or twist in the use of the acronym for the liaisons officer role can be 
broken into those that staff the fusion centers and those field personnel that liaise with the 
fusion center. Many centers fill staff positions with personnel loaned or detailed from 
their primary agencies. Often times these “detailed” personnel assume the title of TLO 
while professional analyst fills the full time positions by staff specifically trained in 
information and intelligence analysis. As noted in Chapter III, three of the centers, 
Arizona, Los Angeles, and southwest Texas, utilize the TLO title while one (southern 
Nevada) utilizes FLO title, and one (northern Virginia) utilizes the ILO title. 
D. QUANTITY OF LIAISON OFFICERS 
The studied fusion centers have structured their data collection and information 
flow to fire and EMS personnel very differently. The density of trained liaison offers 
results in very different amounts of information captured and a different form of 
intelligence being created and disseminated. As noted Chapter III, Table 6, the number of 
trained liaison officers ranges from two dozen at the NVRIC to almost two thousand at 
the SNCTC. Table 10 outlines the ratio of trained liaison personnel per fire department 
and the ratio of trained liaison personnel to the total number of fire and EMS personnel in 
the AOR. 
Table 10.   Ratio of Trained Personnel to Number of Departments and 
Number of Personnel 
Fusion Center Ratio to number of 
Departments 
Ratio to number of Total 
Personnel 
ACTIC Unknown Unknown 
LA JRIC 12 per department 1 in every 15 personnel 
SNCTC  211 per department 1 in every 1.5 personnel 
SWTFC Unknown Unknown 
NVRIC 2 per department 1 in every 192 personnel 
 
Table 10 highlights two distinct approaches to outreach training and liaison. The 
SNCTC has roughly 1,900 trained TLOs throughout the nine agencies in the Las Vegas-
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Henderson-Paradise metropolitan area. This results in one out of every two fire or EMS 
personnel being trained as TLOs. A clearly different approach to liaison is taken by the 
NVRIC; it utilizes 26 ILOs among the 11 fire and EMS agencies in the northern Virginia 
area. This results in a ratio of one trained liaison for every 192 fire and EMS personnel. 
As highlighted earlier in this chapter, the NVRIC utilizes the ILO outreach and liaison 
model, which accounts for this difference. 
E. ROLE OF LIAISON OFFICERS 
As outlined above in the quantity of liaison officer section, some departments and 
fusion centers select to have a very limited group of senior level department officials as 
opposed to training the majority of the department personnel as TLOs. Agencies and 
fusion centers utilizing the senior level liaison officer model create a natural data and 
information check and balance stop. This check and balance stop allows for the bulletins, 
releases, and intelligence products to be reviewed, synthesized to the agencies need, and 
selectively distributed to agency personnel with the need to know. The opposite model is 
one where almost 50 percent of the employees in the agency receive the push directly 
from the fusion center, as each employee is a TLO and a recipient on the fusion center 
distribution list. 
F. CLOSING 
The title of the liaison officers has impact on their interactions with personnel 
outside of the intelligence community, especially if the liaison is responsible for 
providing information to similar disciplines. The connotations and message that is 
perceived and conveyed by a specific title, be it terrorism or fusion or intelligence, impact 
the liaisons acceptance in some interactions. Of equal impact on outreach to the 
firefighters and paramedics on the rigs is the role of liaison officer the department selects. 
Having over 50 percent of the department trained as liaisons is very different than only 
training several key individuals in each department. Chapter V looks closely at the 
number of responders and fire and EMS departments served by each fusion center and 
how this plays a role in the effectiveness of outreach, interaction, and education. 
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V. SIZE AND OUTREACH 
This chapter looks closely at two sections of the fusion center operation. The first 
is the size of the fusion center AOR, the number of fire and EMS agencies served by the 
fusion centers, and how the size of the AOR and the number of responders/agencies 
correlates to effective outreach, interaction, and education. The second analysis looks at 
the presence of a uniformed fire officer at the fusion center and their impact on the 
outreach, interaction, and education. 
A. ANALYSIS OF FUSION CENTER AOR SIZE AND OUTREACH 
To establish a baseline for comparison to measure and compare each state, an 
analysis of the 50 states and the District of Columbia on size and structure was 
performed. The three U.S. territories with primary fusion centers were excluded from the 
analysis due to a lack of information about their fire department. These baselines centered 
around the state’s size in square mile of land and water, the number of counties or 
statistically equivalent entities,65 the population based upon the 2013 U.S. Census Bureau 
data, and the number of fire departments in the state. The fire department data was 
derived from the DHS U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) January 2015 National Fire 
Department Census data. This data represents 90 percent of the fire departments through 
the county based upon a self-reporting program. As of January 2015, there were 27,140 
departments registered with the National Fire Department Census.66 For the 11 states67 
with more than one fusion center, the analysis included both primary and recognized 
fusion centers. The full table analysis is available in Appendix B.  
                                                 
65 County is the primary legal division for sub-municipal organizations. In some states the term is 
district, parish, or boroughs. This paper utilizes county to identify county and all statistically equivalent 
entities. 
66 “National Fire Department Census Quick Facts,” U.S. Fire Administration, October 2, 2015, 
https://apps.usfa.fema.gov/census/summary. 
67 The states are: California (6), Florida (3), Illinois (2), Michigan (2), Missouri (3), Nevada (2), Ohio 
(3), Pennsylvania (3), Texas (7), Virginia (2), and Wisconsin (2). The number in parentheses indicates the 
total of primary and recognized fusion centers in the state. 
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The size disparity across the 50 states is enormous. The smallest state, Rhode 
Island, is just over 1,500 square miles, while Alaska is the largest at roughly 665,000 
square miles.68 The state footprint is meaningless when not associated to the state’s 
population as Alaska has only 735,000 residents while Rhode Island has just over 
1,000,000 residents.69 Table 11 places the five studied fusion centers in perspective to the 
area and population served as compared to the 50 states and the three territories. The rank 
column represents the fusion center as if it was a state. 
Table 11.   Fusion Center Comparison in Area and Population 
Fusion Center Size of AOR Size Rank Population70 Population 
Rank 
ACTIC 114,000 671 6.7 15 
LA JRIC 40,000 38 18 5 
SNCTC 8,000 48 1.5 40 
SWTFC 1,240 51 2.3 36 
NVRIC 1,089 51 2.8 35 
 
Two of the studied fusion centers, LA JRIC and SNCTC, service AORs larger 
than many states, and all of the studied fusion center population rank higher than dozens 
of states. They are amongst the top 10 percent of U.S. population centers as calculated by 
the U.S. Census Bureau.72 
The comparison of the fusion center size of the AOR and the population identifies 
that the five studied centers serve a diverse group of large states to small urban areas 
while also supporting predominately large dense metropolitan areas. Four of the studied 
                                                 
68 U.S. Census Bureau, United States Summary: 2010, Population and Housing Unit Counts, 2010 
Census of Population and Housing (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/cph-2-1.pdf.  
69 Ibid.  
70 Population in millions.  
71 As the ACTIC covers the entire state of Arizona—the ACTIC rankings corresponds to the actual 
Arizona state positions.  
72 “Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Incorporated Places of 50,000 or More, Ranked 
by July 1, 2014 Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2014,” U.S. Census Bureau Population Division, May 
2015, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk.  
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AORs focus on dense population centers while the ACTIC serves the entire state of 
Arizona.  
B. STATE AND COUNTY FIRE DEPARTMENT STRUCTURE 
The exact structure and affiliation of individual fire departments to the county or 
municipal level to the state level varies from state to state, but all follow a general 
structure. The individual fire departments are separately organized and the department 
frequently operates as a corporation under general business law. The individual fire 
departments in the county sub-division operate under an association or committee 
process. This is frequently a group of fire department leaders that are elected or selected 
to establish common objectives, operating procedures, and support activities for all the 
departments with the set geographic boundary.  
The next level above the county sub-division may be a statewide fire department 
association, committee, or chief’s group or a mid-level regional sub-division that groups 
multiple counties. Like the county level group, the statewide group focuses on setting 
direction and guidance to the county and/or regional association or committees while 
obtaining direction and guidance from the state governor or public safety director or 
similar elected or appointed official. This creates a multiple tier system from the local 
community fire chief to the statewide policy decision element. 
C. FUSION CENTER OUTREACH TO FIRE DEPARTMENTS 
A state’s size influences county division within the state. For instance, Texas, as 
the second largest state, has 254 counties while Delaware, the forty-nine state in size, is 
divided into three counties. Relational to the number of counties in the state is the number 
of fire departments. Texas has 1,519 departments while Delaware records 58 departments 
spread across its 2,500 square miles. The table in Appendix B includes data on the 
number of counties in each state. 
One critical element to effective outreach, interaction, and education for the 
fusion center liaison staff is frequent contact and interaction with local and regional 
public safety managers and leaders. While on-going and recurring contact and interaction 
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can be accomplished via email, bulletins, or conference/video calls, face-to-face contact 
opens more doors. In large states, measured by both geographical size and or population, 
this level of interaction is a huge hurdle for the fusion fire liaison personnel unless the 
liaison position is staffed with multiple personnel to distribute the AOR into smaller 
segments.  
Imagine the analyst in Minnesota who attempts to outreach to over 700 fire 
departments spread over 87 counties and just under 87,000 square miles. Minnesota is 
supported by one fusion center located in Saint Paul, a suburb of Minneapolis, along the 
state’s eastern border with Wisconsin. This requires a three and a half hour one-way car 
trip to the southwest border communities of Luverne, near South Dakota, and a six-hour 
one-way trip to Warroad, along the northern state boarder with Canada.  
For the 39 states with a single fusion center, the average number of counties is 53, 
and the average number of fire departments is 438. This creates an almost insurmountable 
challenge of getting the fusion center liaison staff to all segments of the state, to at least 
interact with the county fire department association or chiefs committee. 
D. AOR AND NUMBER OF FIRE DEPARTMENTS 
Part of the analysis for this thesis includes looking at the number of fire 
departments in each state when compared to the number of fire and EMS agencies served 
by the studied fusion centers. Excluding the District of Columbia, with three reported 
departments in the USFA Census data, the lowest number of departments is found in 
Hawaii, which has with 11. In contrast, Pennsylvania records 1,795 departments.  
Recall that Table 2 in Chapter III outlined the number of fire and EMS agencies 
supported by the studied fusion centers. The SNCTC was the lowest at nine, followed 
closely by the NVRIC at 11. The SWTFC supports 35 agencies while the ACTIC 
supports 66. The LA JRIC supports 124 fire and EMS agencies in seven counties that 
comprise their AOR. The LA JRIC supports more fire and EMS agencies in their AOR 
than reported in the entire states of Wyoming, Nevada, Rhode Island, Delaware, and 
Hawaii. 
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The USFA census data identifies 248 fire departments in Arizona73 while the 
ACTIC reported supporting 66. The delta develops from the ACTIC internal requirement 
that a TLO must be a sworn paid fire department official. The 400 active TLOs 
interacting with the ACTIC are from 66 departments across the state. The USFA census 
data breaks down the 248 departments as: 62 career, 41 mostly career, 65 mostly 
volunteer, and 80 volunteer.74 The ACTIC utilizes the Community Liaison Program 
(CLP), which provides outreach to volunteer fire departments 
The comparison of the fusion center AOR and the number of fire departments 
identifies that the five studied centers are effective at outreach, interaction, and education. 
This is true while each fusion center supports a wide range of fire and EMS agencies, 
ranging from a small core group, nine or 11, or, in the case of LA JRIC, up to 124 
departments.   
The geographic territory supported by many fusion centers is massive. While 
some smaller states account for far less population and square miles than do some large 
metropolitan areas—the need for interaction, outreach, and education to fire and EMS 
agencies does not diminish with size. The 251 fire departments in Connecticut, the 246 
fire departments in Maryland, and the 292 fire departments in South Dakota all have the 
same need for support from their respective fusion center. The geographic difference in a 
state, such as the 77,000 square miles in South Dakota and the 5,500 square miles in 
Connecticut, make the task much more challenging. 
E. FIRE OFFICER IN FUSION CENTER 
Each of the studied fusion centers had at least one uniformed fire officer assigned 
to the fusion center. All of the fusion centers operated with a minimum of a captain rank 
as the liaison to the fusion center with some having multiple fulltime personnel. The 
fusion centers with multiple uniformed liaisons frequently have a first or second level 
chief officer, often identified as a battalion or assistant chief, filling the second or third 
position. In traditional station duties and assignments, the captain position is responsible 
                                                 
73 “National Fire Department Census Quick Facts,” U.S. Fire Administration.  
74 Ibid.  
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for supervision and management of staff consisting of multiple other crewmembers and 
multiple services. The battalion chief position is the first level command officer, who 
carries out primary administrative and management work both focused on direct 
emergency response. She or he is also responsible for coordinating and exchanging 
information with other fire department personnel, other public safety/response 
organizations, and the public. 
The captain provides direction, instruction, supervision, and guidance along with 
planning and coordinating work while exchanging information with fire department 
personnel, other public safety/response organizations, and the public. This places the 
captain as a “trusted” firefighter who rides apparatus and establishes the bridge to 
outreach to the other departments. The captain’s position brings along the field credibility 
in the fire department, similar to the detective in law enforcement agencies. The fire 
officer, regardless of rank, is able to provide context and field experience to the analysis 
and fusion process that the analyst does not possess nor can relate. This lack of context 
and field experience can lead to lost opportunities, failed connections, or exclusion from 
critical information flow. 
F. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 
In all five fusion centers, the fire officer fills more of a liaison or conduit role than 
that of an analyst. Each of the centers had either dedicated civilian fire and EMS analyst 
or a pool or team of professional analysts that focus on identifying and extract key points 
from products, reports, and documents to then analyze the key points. They then 
synthesize the points into a report that support the mission assignment. The Federal 
Bureau of Investigations (FBI) breaks intelligence analysts into three categories: 
strategic, tactical, or collection/reporting.75 The FBI provides a general description of the 
strategic analyst as working on “long term threats on a broad scale” while the tactical 
analyst is “less big picture and more boots on the ground”76 and the collection/reporting 
                                                 
75 “Intelligence Analysts: Part 2 The Subject Matter Experts,” Federal Bureau of Investigations, 
August 23, 2011, https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/august/intelligence-analysts-subject-matter-
experts.  
76 Ibid.  
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analyst utilize the intelligence data tools and work to integrate across agency systems. As 
noted above the fire officer in each of the fusion centers is a liaison/conduit for the field 
providers to the fusion center professional analyst, a mix of strategic and tactical. 
G. FIRE OFFICER—INTELLIGENCE ANALYST OR DISCIPLINE 
EXPERT 
As noted above, all of the fusion centers have professional analyst filling their 
intelligence and analysis positions and utilize the uniformed fire officer as an expert from 
the fire and EMS discipline. This role, combined with the fire department rank of captain, 
molds nicely into a position of trust with the field personnel and fire department chiefs 
while providing a respected field responder/practitioner inside the fusion center. 
H. CLOSING 
The size of the fusion center AOR and the number of fire and EMS agencies 
served by the fusion center vary greatly from state to state. The larger the area, the more 
departments and personnel the fusion center is tasked with supporting, and the more 
critical adequate fusion center staffing becomes. Along with sufficient staffing for the 
liaison positions, utilizing a uniformed fire officer paired up with the tactical and/or 
strategic analyst builds a strong team to support outreach, interaction, and education.  
Chapter VI outlines the four key functions that this study has developed that can 
be implemented at fusion centers to improve the outreach, interaction, and education with 








The members of the U.S. fire and EMS agencies have reacted to the world 
changing events of September 11, 2001, the mass transit attacks in London and Madrid, 
the hybrid targeted violence of the 2008 Mumbai attacks as well as the increase in active 
shooter violence. The reaction has been to increase training and preparedness for a 
broader range of threats, emergencies, and incidents. While this additional training is 
appropriate for ensuring awareness and safer response to incidents, it does not go far 
enough towards collecting field responder observations with the hope of better actionable 
intelligence. Fire and EMS personnel are uniquely positioned to collect data that may 
result in actionable intelligence if it were effectively collected and analyzed. 
While some fusion centers are effective in their approaches to outreach, 
interaction, and education to fire and EMS personnel, this thesis focused on four (4) key 
functions that are present in the studied centers and can be used to improve the operations 
at other fusion centers. The four functions are: 
• Provide basic terrorism outreach and education training to all public safety 
personnel: 
• Distribute intelligence products to key decision makers in each agency: 
• Utilize uniformed senior fire and EMS line officers as subject matter 
experts to the fusion center analysis staff, and: 
• Utilize multiple fire and EMS liaisons to deliver actionable intelligence 
back to front line fire and EMS personnel. Additional liaison(s) to be 
added, as needed, to support broad geographical areas to address span of 
control issues. 
A. RECOMMENDATION 1: BASIC TERRORISM TRAINING 
Each fusion center establishes its training and outreach program with targeted 
audience expectations based upon their outreach model, to a wide range of fire and EMS 
personnel or a narrower group of key decision makers. This creates different levels of 
training among fire and EMS personnel. As outlined in Chapter VI, several of the studied 
fusion centers train nearly 50 percent of the fire and EMS responders in the AOR as 
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TLOs while other fusion centers focus training and outreach to key fire and EMS agency 
decision makers.  
Training the two million fire and EMS personnel on suspicious activity behaviors 
and indicators would significantly increase the reporting of suspicious activity observed 
during the regular activates of fire and EMS personnel. Hazardous materials awareness 
was integrated in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In a similar fashion, initial suspicious 
activity report (SAR) training as well as reoccurring training must become a basic 
element of initial training for all personnel. Incorporating basic terrorism training for all 
personnel would expand the umbrella of fire and EMS personnel who can identify the 
behaviors and indicators beyond just the trained TLOs. 
To ensure that all of the nearly two million fire and EMS personnel across the 
country are able to recognize the suspicious behaviors and indicators associated with pre-
incident terrorism activities, an expanded push must be made by each of the 78 fusion 
centers to support the National Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI). NSI 
is a joint effort of the FBI, DHS, along with STLL law enforcement agencies, and seeks 
to offer basic training for all personnel in recognition and identification of suspicious 
activity. Since the fall of 2013, NSI has been the focus of the FBI, DHS, and Bureau of 
Justice Assistance for a coordinated training platform for “seamless sharing of SAR’s”77 
while working closely with the National Network of Fusion Centers to support the local 
fusion center training and SAR process. 
NSI currently provides a free nationwide platform for web-based training 
targeting emergency responders, police, fire and EMS personnel on the recognizing 
behaviors that are frequently association with pre-incident terrorism activities while 
ensuing that the public’s civil rights and liberties are protected. The NSI has also created 
similar SAR awareness web-based trainings for private sector security, parole and 
correction officers, 9-1-1 operators, emergency management officials, public health and 
health care, and workers in the maritime industry.  
                                                 
77 “About the NSI,” Nationwide SAR Initiative, accessed September 25, 2015, 
https://nsi.ncirc.gov/about_nsi.aspx.  
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The transition to the NSI platform will result in training and outreach savings for 
fusion centers that utilize a wide saturation TLO training delivery model. These fusion 
centers will be able to reduce classroom based training sessions as the NSI training can 
replace the majority of the classroom TLO sessions.  
B. RECOMMENDATION 2: ESTABLISH KEY POINTS OF CONTACT 
Currently, too much information is being distributed and cross-distributed 
between and among numerous distribution lists on terrorism related subjects. This leads 
to the readers becoming overloaded with information and unable to quickly access and 
implement relevant pieces of information that would improve incident prevention and/or 
response. If fire and EMS agencies selected a core group of key senior chief level 
decision makers to be the conduit from their given agency to the fusion center, the 
information passed along would be more streamlined and come with specific directions 
on how and where the information was to be applied. Currently, NVRIC does just this 
using the ILO model. For example, the key decision maker follows agency procedures for 
review of the joint bulletin, roll call release, or suspicious activity report to determine the 
applicability to his or her specific agency and personnel.  
C. RECOMMENDATION 3: UNIFORMED FIRE LIAISON TO FUSION 
CENTER 
All of the studied fusion centers operate with uniformed senior fire and EMS line 
officers as liaisons/subject matter experts for the fusion center analysis staff. This places 
an experienced field provider/responder in the fusion center to support the fusion center 
watch section, the intelligence and analysis staff, as well as, the liaison and training staff. 
This uniformed officer provides a field perspective to the analysis while provide 
credibility of the information source when distributed to the field responders.  
All fusion centers and fire and EMS agencies must develop a program upon 
which uniformed fire and EMS line officer (or officers) are assigned to all fusion centers. 
A frequent hurdle that limits the assignment or detail of an operational fire or EMS 
officer to the fusion center is the salary and backfill cost to the department. The funding 
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issues, while on the surface are significant, can be overcome by designing the officer’s 
position to be both a liaison as well as a suspicious activity reporting (SAR) POC. 
There are three primary grant sources available to fire and EMS departments to 
provide support to fusion center operations: DHS HSGP, FEMA UASI, and DOJ JAG. 
These grants can be utilized to completely or in part fund the positions within the fusion 
center.   
D. RECOMMENDATION 4: MULTIPLE LIAISONS TO SUPPORT WIDE 
AREAS 
The fusion centers need to carefully plan the number of liaison offers they have so 
that liaisons are not overwhelmed with the size of their territory or breadth of their 
assigned regions, counties, or agencies. As noted in Chapter V and shown in Appendix B, 
some fusion centers support over 700 fire departments spread out across almost 90,000 
square miles and just under 90 counties. This creates an enormous AOR that is 
impractical to manage with limited fusion center interaction, outreach, and education 
staff. 
One core element to effective outreach is a manageable element of agencies, 
counties, and communities assigned to a specific analyst or liaison. Each fusion center 
must review its specific AOR and the geographic features, the defined organization/sub-
division of the state’s fire and EMS agencies, and the infrastructure of the fusion center to 
create a manageable distribution of work. Establishing manageable groupings of 
agencies, counties, and regional divisions of the AOR will develop into effective 
interaction, outreach, and education pathways for the fusion center. 
The same grant funding sources as outlined earlier for the uniformed fire liaison 
are available for multiple liaison officer positions. As the need for multiple liaisons varies 
based upon the state/fusion center specific issues, each state legislature and/or the fusion 
center sponsoring agency should be approached for funding. As these liaison positions 
will have a connection and/or affiliation to the fire and EMS agencies, the statewide 




Four predominate practices emerged from the study of five fusion centers. These 
practices have resulted in effective interaction, outreach, and education programs to the 
fire and EMS agencies and should be considered for adoption in other fusion centers. The 
ability for the fire or EMS personnel to identify and appropriately report suspicious 
behaviors and indicators of potential terrorist activities would result in more actionable 
intelligence that could prevent future tragedies. The two million fire and EMS responders 
answer thousands of calls a day, and their expanded ability to submit SARs will better 
enable law enforcement to interrupt the planning of a terror plot. 
The fusion centers have developed into a strong network of analysis and sharing 
centers of terrorism data. The effectiveness of the fusion centers can be improved with 
the broader integration of fire and EMS agencies/personnel. This expansion requires 
intergroup communication and sharing as well as funding to place the proper personnel in 
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APPENDIX A. FUSION CENTER QUESTIONNAIRE 
Name:         Rank/Title:       
Contact Information Email:          
Agency:         Phone:        
Fusion Center Name:        
 
Geographic Data for Area of Responsibility (AOR) 
General geographic description of AOR [Enter response here] 
 
Size of AOR—square mileage [Enter response here] 
 
Number of residents in AOR [Enter response here] 
 
Number of municipalities in AOR [Enter response here] 
 
Number of fire and EMS providers in AOR [Enter response here] 
 
Number of fire and EMS agencies in AOR [Enter response here] 
 
 
Fusion Center (FC)—Structure 
What year was the FC created? [Enter response here] 
 
What year was your FC recognized by DHS as a FC? [Enter response here] 
 
What is the primary mission of your FC? [Enter response here] 
 






Fusion Center (FC)—Structure (continued) 
Does the FC governance include a representative(s) from 
a fire/EMS agency? If no, please explain. 
 
[Enter response here] 
 
Is the FC co-located with a fire/EMS agency or an 
emergency management agency? If not, who is the 
primary/host agency? 
[Enter response here] 
Does the FC have a dedicated fire/EMS analyst? If no, 
please explain. 
[Enter response here] 
 
What is the analysis background/training? [Enter response here] 
 
Do they work onsite daily at the FC? [Enter response here] 
 
Are they uniformed, civilian, or have volunteer Fire/EMS 
background? 
[Enter response here] 
 
Does the FC have baseline Fire/EMS intelligence 
requirements? Please provide a copy. 
[Enter response here] 
 
Are the FC’s baselines capabilities in line with the Fire 
Service Integration for Fusion Centers Appendix? 
[Enter response here] 
Does the FC use the terrorism liaison officer (TLO) 
program for outreach? 
[Enter response here] 
 
In this question TLO is a broad grouping, including TLO, intelligence liaison officer (ILO), and fusion 
liaison officer (FLO) 
If so—how many fire/EMS terrorism liaison officers do 
you have 
[Enter response here] 
 
Does the FC collaborate and liaise with the fire/EMS 
agencies in their area of responsibility? 
[Enter response here] 
How do they liaise? 
How often? 
[Enter response here] 
 






How many staff hours, of the fire/EMS analyst or other 
FC staff, are dedicated to training fire/EMS providers in 
the center’s AOR 
[Enter response here] 
 
What type(s) of outreach does the fusion center 
participate in? 
[Enter response here] 
 
Does the FC have regular meetings with the fire/EMS 
agencies? 
[Enter response here] 
 
How frequent does the FC push bulletins to the fire/EMS 
agencies? 
[Enter response here] 
 
What triggers the FC to send out the bulletins? [Enter response here] 
 
Does the FC have separate groups of contacts or 
organizations under fire/EMS? 
[Enter response here] 
 
What agencies does the fire/EMS analyst collaborate with 
on a regular basis? 
[Enter response here] 
 
 
Suspicious Activity Reporting 
Does the FC have a suspicious activity reporting process 
for fire/EMS personnel to submit? 
[Enter response here] 
 
Is it on-line? Paper/fax or other? [Enter response here] 
 
Have suspicious activity reports been reported by 
fire/EMS agencies? 
[Enter response here] 
 
Have suspicious activity reports submitted by fire/EMS 
agencies been used to support investigations? 
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APPENDIX B. NUMBERS 







Alabama 52,420.07  4,833,000  67 1 799 
Alaska 665,384.04  735,000  30 1 157 
Arizona 113,990.30  6,626,000  15 1 248 
Arkansas 53,178.55  2,959,000  75 1 675 
California 163,694.74  38,332,000  58 6 870 
Colorado 104,093.67  5,268,000  64 1 325 
Connecticut 5,543.41  3,596,000  8 1 251 
Delaware 2,488.72  925,000  3 1 58 
District of 
Columbia 68.34  646,000  1 1 3 
Florida 65,757.70  19,552,000  67 3 477 
Georgia 59,425.15  9,992,000  159 1 463 
Guam 570.62  182,000    1   
Hawaii 10,931.72  1,404,000  5 1 11 
Idaho 83,568.95  1,612,000  44 1 193 
Illinois 57,913.55  12,882,000  102 2 1103 
Indiana 36,419.55  6,570,000  92 1 762 
Iowa 56,272.81  3,090,000  99 1 731 
Kansas 82,278.36  2,893,000  105 1 502 
Kentucky 40,407.80  4,380,000  120 1 677 
Louisiana 52,378.13  4,625,000  64 1 416 
Maine 35,379.74  1,328,000  16 1 338 
Maryland 12,405.93  5,928,000  24 1 263 
Massachusetts 10,554.39  6,692,000  14 1 362 
Michigan 96,713.51  9,895,000  83 2 962 
Minnesota 86,935.83  5,420,000  87 1 726 
Mississippi 48,431.78  2,991,000  82 1 416 
Missouri 69,706.99  6,044,000  115 3 772 
Montana 147,039.71  1,015,000  56 1 279 
Nebraska 77,347.81  1,868,000  93 1 389 
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Nevada 110,571.82  2,790,000  17 2 86 
New Hampshire 9,349.16  1,323,000  10 1 212 
New Jersey 8,722.58  8,899,000  21 1 709 
New Mexico 121,590.30  2,085,000  33 1 244 
New York 54,554.98  19,651,000  62 1 1664 
North Carolina 53,819.16  9,848,000  100 1 1078 
North Dakota 70,698.32  723,000  53 1 324 
Ohio 44,825.58  11,570,000  88 3 1143 
Oklahoma 69,898.87  3,850,000  77 1 740 
Oregon 98,378.54  3,930,000  36 1 307 
Pennsylvania 46,054.35  12,773,000  67 3 1795 
Puerto Rico 5,324.84  3,596,000    1   
Rhode Island 1,544.89  1,051,000  5 1 72 
South Carolina 32,020.49  4,774,000  46 1 441 
South Dakota 77,115.68  844,000  66 1 292 
Tennessee 42,144.25  6,495,000  95 1 637 
Texas 268,596.46  26,448,000  254 7 1519 
U.S. Virgin 
Islands 732.93  104,000    1   
Utah 84,896.88  2,900,000  29 1 194 
Vermont 9,616.36  626,000  14 1 202 
Virginia 42,774.93  8,260,000  133 2 547 
Washington 71,297.95  6,971,000  39 1 397 
West Virginia 24,230.04  1,854,000  55 1 409 
Wisconsin 65,496.38  5,742,000  72 2 775 
Wyoming 97,813.01  582,000  23 1 114 
Population source: 2013 U.S. Census data. “United States Summary: 2010, Population 
and Housing Unit Counts, 2010 Census of Population and Housing,” U.S. Census 
Bureau, September 2012, http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/cph-2-1.pdf. 
Number of fire departments source: United States Fire Administration, “2015 National 
Fire Department Census Quick Facts, U.S. Fire Administration, October 5, 2015, 
https://apps.usfa.fema.gov/census/summary. USFA data does not include the three 
territories.  
Size measured in square miles, including land and water. 
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